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Abstract
The Dolev–Yao model is a simple and useful framework in which to analyze security protocols,
but it assumes that the adversary is extremely limited. We show that it is possible for the results of
this model to remain valid even if the adversary is given additional power. In particular, we show
that there exist situations in which Dolev–Yao adversary can be viewed as a valid abstraction of all
realistic adversaries. We do this in a number of steps:
(1) The Dolev–Yao model places strong assumptions on the adversary.We capture those assumptions
in the computational model (an alternate framework with a very powerful adversary) as a non-
malleability property of public-key encryption.
(2) We prove an Abadi–Rogaway-style indistinguishability property (J. Cryptol. 15(2) (2002)
103–127) for the public-key setting. That is, we show that if two Dolev–Yao expressions are
indistinguishable to the Dolev–Yao adversary, then their computational interpretations (via a
chosen-ciphertext secure encryption scheme) are computationally indistinguishable.
(3) We show that any encryption scheme that satisﬁes the indistinguishability property also satisﬁes
our (more natural) non-malleability property.
© 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Computational soundness; Formal encryption; Dolev–Yao model; Non-malleability
1. Introduction
How can we tell if a cryptographic protocol is secure? Phrased another way, how can we
be sure that a given protocol meets a given security goal? Before we can analyze a protocol
we need to choose a model: a collection of assumptions and proof methods.
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The computational model, for example, is well known. The messages of a protocol are
assumed to be bit-strings from some distribution and the adversary is assumed to be an
arbitrary algorithm. The cryptographic primitives are assumed to be algorithms (or tuples
of algorithms) that satisfy some asymptotic property even in the presence of an arbitrary
adversary.
Toprove a protocol secure in thismodel, onewould use a reduction from theprotocol to the
underlying primitive. That is, one would show that if there exists a successful attack on the
protocol, then there exists a successful attack against an underlying cryptographic primitive
such as encryption or signatures. By doing so, one can conclude that if the underlying
cryptographic primitives are secure then the protocol must be secure also. (See [6] for an
example.)
This is a fairly strong model for analysis. The only assumption placed on the adversary
is that it is efﬁcient: executing in probabilistic polynomial time (PPT). 1 This assumption is
fairly weak, giving the model a solid and meaningful grounding in complexity theory. On
the other hand, this model is extremely difﬁcult to use. Reductions tend to be fairly tedious
to design, and must be produced ‘by hand’ for each protocol.
Fortunately, there are alternate models such as the Dolev–Yao model [8]. In this setting,
messages are assumed to be elements of some abstract algebra, and encryption is an abstract
operation of that algebra.The adversary is assumed to be a speciﬁc (albeit non-deterministic)
state machine, and the only way for the adversary to produce new messages is to perform
certain operations on messages it already “knows”.
This model has an extremely nice feature: simplicity. Because the computation model
is symbolic and the adversary is restricted, it is possible to explicitly represent all of the
adversary’s possible behaviors in a compact way. General theorems can be proven about the
limits of the adversary’s powers, and it is relatively easy to show the adversary’s goals to be
outside its range of possible behaviors. This simplicity allows a great deal of automation.
Although the problem of protocol security is undecidable in general [9], it is decidable for
an important sub-class of protocols [24]. Furthermore, several automated tools have been
successfully used. (See [14,23,26] for typical examples. Also see [16] for a recent survey
of the ﬁeld.)
However, this model also has a drawback: the Dolev–Yao adversary is actually quite
weak. Although it can pick from among the allowed operations non-deterministically, the
set of allowed operations is ﬁxed and quite small. It is unclear whether security against
this restricted adversary implies security against more realistic adversary models. It is also
unclear how security statements from the Dolev–Yao model transfer to the computational
model.
It seems that one must choose between the simplicity of the Dolev–Yao model and the
solid grounding of the computational model. However, is this choice necessary?Are the two
models irreconcilable? In particular, is it necessarily true that Dolev–Yao proofs of security
will have no computational meaning?
This is a large question, and in this paper we only discuss one small part: the adversary.
In particular, we show that the use of sufﬁciently strong primitives from computational
1 That is, it has access to an inﬁnite tape of random bits and executes in time polynomial in the length of its
(non-random) input.
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cryptography forces an equivalence of sorts between the Dolev–Yao adversary and all
computational adversaries. That is, we do four things:
• Wedescribe theDolev–Yaomodel, and extract a natural computational security condition
that summarizes its strong assumptions regarding the adversary (Sections 3 and 4).
• We investigate a previous effort in this area [3] that related, in the symmetric-key setting,
the passiveDolev–Yaoadversary to thepassive computational one. In particular, this effort
showed that if two Dolev–Yao messages are indistinguishable to the passive Dolev–Yao
adversary, then the natural interpretations of these two messages in the computational
setting will be indistinguishable to the passive computational adversary.We translate this
result to the public-key setting (Section 5).
• We show that this indistinguishability property is no more powerful than other, standard
deﬁnitions of security from computational cryptography (also Section 5).
• Lastly, we show that our more natural security condition is no more powerful than the
indistinguishability property (Section 6).
We ﬁnish by discussing avenues for future work (Section 7). First, however, we discuss
other efforts in this same area.
2. Related work
The question we discuss has already been partially addressed in the work by Abadi and
Rogaway ([2,3], and continued in [1,17,18]) which served as a great source of inspiration
for this work. In particular, these authors derived and implemented the indistinguishability
property that will play such a central role here. The indistinguishability property we deﬁne
and use in this paper is a direct analogue of theirs, translated from the symmetric-encryption
setting to that of asymmetric encryption. Because of differences between these two settings,
our indistinguishability property will be stronger than theirs in some places and weaker
than theirs in others. More importantly, and as opposed to these other efforts, we relate
our indistinguishability property to the property of malleability. That is, we show that the
computational adversary can be prohibited from producing any message that could not also
be produced by the Dolev–Yao adversary.
The relationship between indistinguishability and non-malleability depends on the set-
ting. (See [5] for an examination of this issue.) In the purely computational setting, for
example, non-malleability is strictly stronger than indistinguishability if the computational
adversary has access to public keys only. However, non-malleability and indistinguishability
are equivalent against the chosen-ciphertext attack (i.e., when the adversary has constant
access to a decryption oracle, as it will in Deﬁnition 12). Ours is the ﬁrst investigation
of this issue in the Dolev–Yao model. We show that indistinguishability implies a weak
form of non-malleability: computational encryption that satisﬁes our Dolev–Yao indistin-
guishability property also satisﬁes our Dolev–Yao non-malleability property. The converse
is commonly true in other settings, and is likely to be true here as well. However, while our
investigation is novel it is not exhaustive, and this remains an open question for the time
being.
Another two related research efforts in this area are those of Backes, Pﬁtzmann and
Waidner [4], and Micciancio and Warinschi [19]. In general, these investigations represent
60 J. Herzog / Theoretical Computer Science 340 (2005) 57–81
protocol executions in two different ways: a “real” setting and an “ideal” setting. In the
“real” setting, the execution of a protocol is represented as the communication of Turing
machines that use computational encryption to create bit-string messages. The two lines of
research differ in their representation of the “ideal” setting. Backes et al. use a ‘database’
that stores all messages and tracks which ones are known by whom. This database allows
the adversary to access only those messages it would be able to deduce in the Dolev–Yao
paradigm. Micciancio andWarinschi, on the other hand, represent the ideal setting directly
as symbolic execution in the Dolev–Yao model. The main results of both efforts state that
any behavior that an honest participant can see in the “real” setting could also be seen in
the “ideal” setting. Hence, a proof of security in the “ideal” setting will serve as a proof in
the “real” setting (modulo negligible probabilities).
These works are extremely compelling. However, they focus attention onto the behavior
of the adversary as a whole. That is, they regard the adversary’s behavior as an unknowable
mystery which cannot be broken into component parts. We, on the other hand, regard the
behavior of the adversary as a series of message creations, and leverage a statement about
a single creation into a statement about the adversary’s behavior as a whole.
A less similar approach to the same problem is a recent effort to incorporate polynomial-
time indistinguishability into process algebras [12,13,15,20,21]. Process algebras introduce
grammars for processes that typically encompass a large number of higher-level program-
ming constructs. They also introduce a number of algebraic rewrite and cancellation laws
that allow one to prove two processes equivalent, that their observable behaviors are equiv-
alent, or that the observable behavior of one process is a subset of the observable behavior
of another. In this framework, one can prove a given process to be “safe” by showing that its
observable behavior is the same as, or a subset of, the observable behavior of an idealized
“speciﬁcation” process.
This idea has recently been expanded to include new types of “equivalent” behavior. In
particular, the deﬁnitions of both process and observable behavior have been expanded to
include probabilistic behavior. This allows the deﬁnition of “observationally equivalent”
to mean “indistinguishable to any polynomial-time environment or distinguisher.” This
approach does not provide the tools necessary to prove an original indistinguishability
result, but it does allow one to prove that some given indistinguishability result follows
from another one.Thus, this approach allows one to prove computational results (asymptotic
indistinguishability of probability distributions) via techniques from formal methods (re-
write rules).
3. The Dolev–Yao model
We begin our work by exploring the powers of the adversary in the Dolev–Yao model.
There are actually several variations on theDolev–Yaomodel, each tailored to a speciﬁc tool
or application.We provide and discuss a generic example which uses public-key encryption.
In this setting, messages are assumed to be elements of an algebra A of values. There are
four types of atomic messages:
• Identiﬁers (public, predictable, denoted by I),
• Random nonces (private, unpredictable, denoted byR),
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• Public keys (KPub), and
• Private keys (KPriv).
Compound messages are created by two deterministic operations:
• encrypt : KPub ×A→ A,
• pair : A×A→ A.
We write {|M|}K for enc(K,M) and MN for pair(M,N). 2 We require that there be a
bijection
inv : KPub → KPriv
and byK−1 we mean inv(K)when K is a public key and inv−1(K)when K is a private key.
Although we will consider only public-key encryption in this paper, one could also easily
add symmetric encryption to the Dolev–Yao model by introducing a new key type on which
the inv operation is the identity function.
The algebra is assumed to be free: every value has a unique representation.
In the Dolev–Yao model, there are two kinds of active parties: honest participants and
the adversary. The honest participants follow the steps of the protocol without deviation.
They can engage in multiple runs of the protocol simultaneously and with different parties.
Some versions of the model also contain the internal states of honest participants, others do
not. We will not consider them in this paper.
The network is assumed to be completely under the control of the adversary, who can
record, delete, replay, reroute, reorder, and completely control the scheduling of messages.
This is modeled by letting the adversary be the network: the honest participants send their
messages only to the adversary and receive messages only from the adversary. Thus, we can
consider each execution of the protocol to be an alternating sequence of adversary messages
(qi ∈ A) and environment responses (ri ⊆ A) 3 :
r0 q1 r1 q2 r2 . . . qn−1 rn−1 qn rn.
Typically, each message or response in a protocol execution will be accompanied by such
auxiliary information as nominal sender, intended receiver, and so forth. We will ignore
this auxiliary information in this work, as it will be captured later by any analysis of the
protocol within the Dolev–Yao model. That is, the Dolev–Yao model assumes that the
adversary can non-deterministically choose scheduling and routing of messages, recipients,
and so forth. Thus, an analysis in this model will consider all non-deterministic choices of
recipient, etc., andwill thus capture all possible routing and scheduling strategies of efﬁcient
(computational) adversaries.
In this work, we wish to focus on issues not already captured within the Dolev–Yao
model and so ignore issues of routing and scheduling. Instead, we focus on the limited
non-determinism with which the Dolev–Yao adversary can choose messages to transmit.
The Dolev–Yao model simply assumes that the adversary can choose only from a particular
2When three or more terms are written together, such as M1M2M3, we assume they are grouped to the left.
That is,M1M2M3 = pair(pair(M1,M2),M3).
3 Note that environment responses are actually sets of messages, as it is possible for more than one participant
to transmit a message in a given round.
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set; we examine the strength of this assumption using the framework of computational
cryptography.
The main limitation on the choice of message content is that every query qi must be
derivable from what is known initially and r0, r1, r2 … ri−1. The initial knowledge of the
adversary includes at least the following:
(1) the public keys (KPub),
(2) the private keys of subverted participants (KAdv ⊆ KPriv),
(3) the identiﬁers of the principals (I), and
(4) the nonces the adversary itself generates (RAdv ⊆ R) which are assumed to be distinct
from all nonces generated by honest participants.
(Note that the adversary must receive a set r0 before it sends its ﬁrst message. This message
can be thought of as an “initialization” from the environment which provides the adversary
with any extra information that might be available to it in a particular setting.)
The Dolev–Yao model places severe restrictions on what messages are derivable from
others. Analyses in this model tend to focus on the structure of protocols. That is, they
wish to identify those properties of protocols that exist independently of the encryption
schemes used to implement them. Hence, the Dolev–Yao model assumes that the only
manipulations the adversary can apply with respect to pairing and encryption are those
that must be allowed. The pairing operation must allow pairing and separation, and the
encryption operator must allow encryption and decryption (with known keys). Thus, for a
given message M to be derivable from a set of messages S, it must be possible to produce
it by applying the following operations a ﬁnite number of times:
• decryption with known or learned private keys,
• encryption with public keys,
• pairing of two known elements, and
• separation of a pair into its components.
To combine these two intuitions:
Deﬁnition 1 (Closure). The closure of S, written C[S], is the smallest subset of A such
that:
(1) S ⊆ C[S],
(2) I ∪KPub ∪KAdv ∪RAdv ⊆ C[S],
(3) If {|M|}K ∈ C[S] and K−1 ∈ C[S], thenM ∈ C[S],
(4) IfM ∈ C[S] and K ∈ C[S], then {|M|}K ∈ C[S],
(5) IfMN ∈ C[S], thenM ∈ C[S] and N ∈ C[S], and
(6) IfM ∈ C[S] and N ∈ C[S], thenMN ∈ C[S].
It is the central assumption of the Dolev–Yao model that this closure operation represents
the limit of the ability of the adversary to create new messages:
Deﬁnition 2 (Dolev–Yao adversary). Suppose that
r0 q1 r1 q2 r2 . . . qn−1 rn−1 qn rn
is a protocol execution in the Dolev–Yao model, where q1, q2, . . . , qn ∈ A are messages
from the adversary to honest participants and r0, r1, . . . , rn ⊆ A are the honest participants’
responses. Then for all i, qi ∈ C
[
r0 ∪ · · · ∪ ri−1
]
.
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That is, although theDolev–Yao adversary can choose itsmessages non-deterministically,
it must choose them from within the closure. It is this intuition that we will translate into
the computational model.
4. Relating the Dolev–Yao and computational messages
In this section, we formalize the intuition of Deﬁnition 2 in the language of computational
cryptography, using a series of intermediate attempts. Intuitively, we would like to say that
it should be hard for the computational adversary to produce a single message outside the
closure of its input. Informally:
Attempt 1. An abstract encryption operator provides weak 4 Dolev–Yao public-key non-
malleability if ∀PPT adversaries A, ∀S ⊆ A, ∀M ∈ (A \ C[S])
Pr[N ← A(S) : N = M] is small.
Here, Pr[A;B;C : P ] indicates the probability of predicate P being true after running
experiments A, B and C in series. The notation x ← D indicates x being drawn from
distribution D. If D is a set, the uniform distribution is used. If D is an algorithm, we use
the distribution over output induced by the distribution of the input and the distribution of
D’s random coin ﬂips.
Although this attempt contains the desired intuition, there are two small problems:
• It is unclear how a set S of Dolev–Yaomessages can be passed as input to a computational
adversary, or how a Dolev–Yao message M can be produced as output.
• It is not clear what a “small” probability is.
The purpose of this section is to make the above deﬁnition meaningful. Our main tool for
doing so will be a mapping from Dolev–Yao messages to their computational analogues:
probability distributions on bit-strings. The mapping we present here is congruent to that
given by Abadi and Rogaway [2,3], adapted to the public-key encryption setting.
The “encoding” of a message M ∈ A, written Mt, is a probability distribution that
depends on four things:
• The formal message M,
• The tape (t) which is a sequence of bits. We will think of this tape is being inﬁnite in
length for simplicity, but we will shortly demonstrate that we will need to read only a
ﬁnite portion. We also assume for convenience that we have random access to this tape,
although this can be easily simulated using a standard tape and some book-keeping. In
usage, we will assume that the bits on this tape are random.
• A security parameter, which is a natural number  represented in unary. This parameter
represents the amount of security present in the system. In encryption schemes, for
example, the security parameter can be thought of as the size of keys.
4 In Section 7, we will consider stronger formalizations of this same intuition.
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• An adversary nonce distribution D. This distribution is intended to represent the method
bywhich the adversary chooses the nonces inRAdv. Honest participants will encode their
nonces as -bit random strings; adversary nonces must be  bits in length but may be
chosen in any efﬁcient manner the adversary chooses. We represent this as an arbitrary
algorithm D. This algorithm may be randomized, but as the output is of length , we
assume that no more than  random bits are needed during D’s execution. Therefore, we
formalize D as an efﬁcient (polynomial-time) algorithm from (random) strings of length
 to strings of length .
• An arbitrary public-key encryption scheme, which in the computational setting is a triple
of algorithms. The
◦ G is the key generation algorithm, which takes as input a security parameter  and
outputs a public/private key pair. This algorithm can be randomized, and so can use
a number of random bits polynomial in ; we assume without loss of generality that
this polynomial is identity and that exactly  random bits are used.
◦ E is the encryption algorithm, which takes in as input a public key, a plaintext string.
This algorithm is also randomized, and we assume again that it uses exactly  random
bits. The output is the ciphertext.Wewill writeE(pk, x) for the probability distribution
induced by running E(pk, x), where the randomness results from the  random bits
used.
◦ D is the decryption algorithm, which takes as input a private key and a string. It is
required that Pr
[
D(sk,E(pk, x)) = x] = 1 for all valid key pairs (pk, sk) and all
plaintexts x.
Deﬁnition 3 (Encoding: messages). Let  ∈ N be the security parameter. Let t ∈ {0, 1}
be a random tape, partitioned into a length- segment for each nonce and public key in A,
and let M be the value of the tape partition associated withM. Let D be an adversary nonce
distribution. Let (G,E,D) be a public-key encryption scheme. Then for any M ∈ A, the
encoding of M, written Mt, 5 is deﬁned recursively as:
• If M ∈ R is a nonce, then Mt = 〈M, “nonce”〉 for M ∈ RAdv and Mt =〈D(M), “nonce”〉 forM ∈ RAdv.
• IfM ∈ R is a nonce , then Mt = 〈M, “nonce”〉.
• If (M,M−1) is a public/private key pair, then Mt = 〈e, “pubkey”〉 and M−1t =〈d, “privkey”〉where (e, d) is the output of G(1,M). Note that M is used for random-
ness.
• If M ∈ I is an identiﬁer, then Mt is mapped to 〈m, “id”〉 where m is any (short) bit-
string uniquely associated withM. That is, we do not care how identiﬁers are mapped to
bit-strings so long as each identiﬁer is uniquely represented.We assume that it is efﬁcient
to compute the encoding of a given identiﬁer.
• If M = M1M2, then Mt is the mapping from pairs of distributions to distributions
given by
〈
M1
t
, M2
t
, “pair”
〉
.
5 Both D and (G,E,D) are implicit and determined from context.
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• IfM = {∣∣M ′∣∣}
K
is an encryption, then Mt is the mapping from pairs of distributions
to distributions given by
〈
E
(
M ′t, K
t

)
, Kt, “enc”
〉
If S ⊆ A, then by St we mean
〈
s1
t
, s2
t
, . . .
〉
where s1, s2 are the elements of S in some
canonical order. By M we mean the distribution{
t ← {0, 1} ;m← Mt : m
}
.
The bits on the tape are used to represent the coin ﬂips used to make atomic elements,
and we will later enforce that the tape is ﬁlled with random bits. Compound terms are made
via either bit-string concatenation or a computational encryption scheme. Note that the coin
ﬂips used by the encryption algorithm are not taken from the tape. Hence, 
{∣∣M ′∣∣}
K
t
remains a distribution even if t is ﬁxed.
There are two properties of computational public-key encryption that our encoding
mapping will need to accommodate. First, public-key encryption is not required to hide
the key used to encrypt. We make this possible leak of information explicit in the
deﬁnition above by explicitly concatenating each ciphertext with the encrypting
key.
Secondly, computational public-key encryption is not generally required to hide the length
of the plaintext. For this reason, we need to limit the amount of information about a plain-
text that will be revealed by its length. We will assume that the length of a message de-
pends only on the message’s structure, not any of its component values. More formally,
let the type tree of a formal message be the same as its parse tree except that each leaf
is replaced by its type. We use the same notation for type trees that we do for messages.
Thus, the type tree of a message {|AN |}K (where A ∈ I, N ∈ R and K ∈ KPub) is
{|I R|}KPub .
We assume that the length of a formal message M depends only on TM , the type tree
of M, and the security parameter. This is not an unreasonable assumption. The above
deﬁnition of the encoding mapping implies that all nonces encode to the same length.
The assumption can be trivially enforced for other type trees by padding out to some
maximal length. Thus, we will use
∣∣∣Mt∣∣∣ to designate the unique length of encodings
of M.
The encoding mapping allows formal messages to be represented as bit-strings, which
allows formal messages to be passed to and returned by the computational adversary. This
solves the ﬁrst problem with Attempt 1. Because the mapping also introduced the security
parameter, we can solve the second problem. A probability is “small” if it is negligible in
the security parameter:
Deﬁnition 4 (Negligible). A function f : N → R is negligible if, for any polynomial q,
f () 1
q() for all sufﬁciently large .
(The phrase “for all sufﬁciently large ” is equivalent to ∃0.∀0.)
With these two problems solved, we can re-attempt to translate Deﬁnition 2 into compu-
tational terms:
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Attempt 2. An encryption scheme (G,E,D) provides weak Dolev–Yao public-key non-
malleability if, when used in ·t,
∀PPT adversaries A, ∀ nonce distributions D,
∀ S ⊆ A, ∀M ∈ (A \ C[S]) ,
∀ polynomials q, ∀ sufﬁciently large  :
Pr[ t ← {0, 1} ;
s ← S ∪KPub ∪KAdv ∪RAdv ∪ It;
m← A(1, s) :
m ∈ suppMt ] 1q() .
Here, suppD means the support of distribution D. When the support of a distribution
contains one element, we will treat the distribution itself as a singleton set.
This deﬁnition is still problematic, however, for two technical reasons. First, the input
to the adversary might be of inﬁnite length. The set S may be of inﬁnite length. There
may be an inﬁnite number of elements in I, RAdv, KPub and KAdv. If any of these are
the case, then the restriction of the adversary to probabilistic polynomial-time is meaning-
less. No computational encryption scheme would remain secure against an inﬁnite-time
adversary. For this reason, we require that S be of ﬁnite size. The sets I, RAdv, KPub and
KAdv might still be inﬁnite, so instead of passing them as input we represent them via
oracles:
• Mt(x) returns (the encoding of) the identiﬁer of the xth participant.
• Rt(x) returns (the encoding of) the xth nonce inRAdv (i.e., runs D on  random bits),
• PbKt(x) returns the public key of principal x, and
• PrKt(x) returns the private key of x ∈ K−1t if K−1 ∈ KAdv.
With the introduction of these oracles, we now only need to sample a ﬁnite portion of the
tape to run the “experiments” in Attempt 2. In fact, we need only sample a polynomial
portion. The parse trees of S and M are ﬁxed with respect to the security parameter, hence
to encode this set and message we need only examine the tape for a constant number of
nonces and keys. Since every key and nonce is associated with a -bit section of the tape, the
number of bits required to encode S andM is linear in . Furthermore, the adversary runs in
probabilistic polynomial time, and so can make only a polynomial number of queries to its
oracles. Each oracle response requires  bits (at most) to produce. Hence, the experiments
inAttempt 2 requires only a polynomial number of bits from the tape. For clarity, however,
we will continue to use an inﬁnite tape in our ﬁnal security condition.
Before we produce this ﬁnal condition, however, we must resolve the second problem:
our results rely upon the acyclicity of encryptions. A set of encryptions is acyclic if, when
K1 encrypts K−12 in some element of S, and K2 encrypts K
−1
3 , and so on, this sequence of
keys encrypting keys never loops back on itself. More formally:
Deﬁnition 5 (Acyclic). For an expression M, construct a graph GM where the nodes are
the public/private key pairs used in the expression. We draw an edge from p1 to p2 if inM
the private keyK−12 associated with pair p2 is encrypted withK1, the public key associated
with p1. The expression M is acyclic if the graph GM is acyclic.
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Our results will only hold for acyclic sets S. However, protocols analyzed in the Dolev–
Yao model typically operate in one of three ways:
• Long-term keys are used to encrypt session keys, which themselves never encrypt other
keys,
• The present session key is used to encrypt the next session key, but never the previous, or
• Keys are never encrypted at all.
None of these cases will produce cyclic encryptions.
Thus, we arrive at our ﬁnal security condition:
Deﬁnition 6 (Weak Dolev–Yao public-key non-malleability). The encryption scheme
(G,E,D) provides weak Dolev–Yao public-key non-malleability if, when used in  · t,
the
∀PPT adversaries A, ∀ nonce distributions D,
∀ acyclic ﬁnite S ⊆ A, ∀M ∈ C[S] ,
∀ polynomials q, ∀ sufﬁciently large  :
Pr[ t ← {0, 1}
s ← St;
m← AMt(·),PbKt(·),PrKt(·),Rt(·)(1, s) :
m ∈ suppMt ] 1q() .
Themain purpose of this section has been to derive this security condition, which directly
captures the assumptions of the Dolev–Yao adversary. However, there exist other security
conditions that formalize theDolev–Yaomodel.We consider one of these in the next section.
5. An indistinguishability lemma
In this section, we consider the indistinguishability-based deﬁnitions of Dolev–Yao secu-
rity originally derived by Abadi and Rogaway [2,3]. Intuitively, the deﬁnition of that paper
describes when two formal messages should “look” the same to the formal adversary. A
formal adversary has the power to make certain, limited deductions from formal messages;
two given formal messages should “look” the same when all possible deductions that can
be made about them yield the same results. In particular, the formal adversary of [2,3] is
assumed to be unable to distinguish between two different encryptions (unless it has the
corresponding private key or keys). For example, if the adversary of [2,3] has no other
information, the two messages{∣∣{|A|}K2 B∣∣}K1 K−11 and {∣∣{|C D|}K3 B∣∣}K1 K−11
should be indistinguishable to it no matter what A, B, C and D are.
The fundamental result of Abadi and Rogaway is that if the encoding algorithm uses
sufﬁciently strong computational encryption, then two messages indistinguishable to the
formal adversary will encode to distributions indistinguishable to the computational adver-
sary. Their result applies to the case of symmetric encryption, and we will here translate
it to the case of public-key encryption. This translation will simultaneously strengthen and
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weaken the result. Indistinguishability in the public-key setting requires a stronger similar-
ity between messages than was necessary in the case of symmetric encryption. However,
our results will be able to tolerate the presence of a previously absent strong decryption
oracle.
In both here and the original deﬁnition of Abadi and Rogaway, the adversary may be
able to learn decryption keys from a formal message. It will later be convenient for our
purposes to assume that the adversary knows additional decryption keys which cannot be
learned from the message itself. Therefore, let T be a set of public keys with regard to which
the adversary can decrypt. Then we represent the information that such an adversary can
deduce from a formal message by its public-key pattern 6:
Deﬁnition 7 (Public-key pattern). Let T ⊆ KPub.We recursively deﬁne the functionp(M,
T ) to be:
• p(K, T ) = K if K ∈ K,
• p(A, T ) = A if A ∈ I,
• p(N, T ) = N if N ∈ R,
• p(N1N2, T ) = p(N1, T ) p(N2, T ),
• p({|M|}K , T ) =
{ {|p(M, T )|}K if K ∈ T
〈|TM |〉K o.w. (where TM is the type tree ofM).
Then patternpk (M, T ), the public-key pattern of an expression M relative to the set T, is
p(M,KPub ∩ C[{M} ∪ T ]).
If S ⊆ A is a set of messages, then patternpk (S, T ) is
〈p(s1, C[S ∪ T ]), p(s2, C[S ∪ T ]), . . .〉 ,
where s1, s2,… are the elements of S is some canonical order. The base pattern of amessage
M, denoted patternpk (M), is deﬁned to be patternpk (M,∅), and patternpk (S) is deﬁned to
be patternpk (S,∅).
That is, the base pattern of a message M is exactly that which can be learned from M
itself, without the aid of any additional keys in T.
The grammar/algebra for patterns is exactly that of messages, with the addition of a
new kind of leaf node: 〈|TM |〉K (a “blob” of type-tree TM under key K) which represents
encryptions which cannot be decrypted. Unlike the “blobs” of the symmetric-encryption
patterns of [2,3], these “blobs” are labeled with K and TM . This is because computational
encryption schemes do not necessarily hide either the encrypting key or the plaintext length.
For convenience, we deﬁne a useful relationship between two patterns:
Deﬁnition 8 (Ingredient). IfM,M ′ are two patterns, thenM is an ingredient ofM ′, written
M  M ′, if the parse tree of M is a sub-tree of the parse tree ofM ′.
6 We will use “pattern” to indicate public-key pattern, as opposed to the stronger, symmetric-key deﬁnition of
“pattern” in [3].
J. Herzog / Theoretical Computer Science 340 (2005) 57–81 69
We note that since messages are special forms of patterns, this relationship can be ap-
plied between two messages as well as between a message and a pattern. We also note a
relationship between a message and its pattern:
Theorem 9. If M,M ′ are messages andM ′  patternpk (M), thenM ′ ∈ C[M].
Proof. Suppose that M ′  patternpk (M). Consider the same path from root to M ′ in the
parse tree of M. Along this path, if an interior node (not itself M ′) is in C[M] then both
child nodes are in C[M]:
• C[M] is closed under separation. Hence, if a node is the pair N N ′ and the node is in
C[M], then both N and N ′ are in C[M].
• The two children of a node {|N |}K are N and K. Since K ∈ KPub, K ∈ C[M] automati-
cally. Furthermore, K−1 ∈ C[M] as well: if it were not, then this node ofM’s parse tree
would have been replaced with 〈|TN |〉K in the parse tree of patternpk (M). But 〈|TN |〉K
is not a message and will not contain M ′ in its parse tree. So K−1 ∈ C[M], and since
C[M] is closed under decryption with keys it contains, N ∈ C[M].
Since the root of this path,M itself, is in C[M] by deﬁnition, it must be the case that every
child of every node aboveM ′ in the parse tree ofM is in the set C[M]. Hence,M ′ ∈ C[M]
as well. 
We can extend the encoding operation to the pattern algebra:
Deﬁnition 10 (Encoding: patterns). Let:
• 〈|M|〉t be any ﬁxed bit-string of length
∣∣∣Mt∣∣∣ such as the all-zero string, and
• 〈|M|〉Kt be the mapping from distributions to distributions given by〈
E
(
〈|M|〉t, Kt
)
, Kt, “enc”
〉
.
Patterns allow us to state when two messages appear to be the same to the formal adver-
sary: when they have the same pattern. The standard deﬁnition of ‘appears to be the same’
in the world of computational encryption is that of computational indistinguishability. We
present a more general deﬁnition, which incorporates the possibility of an oracle:
Deﬁnition 11 (Computational indistinguishability). Suppose that {D} and {D′} are
two families of distributions indexed by the security parameter. Then they are computation-
ally indistinguishable with respect to a family of oracles Ox , written DOxD′, if
∀ PPT adversaries A, ∀ polynomials q, ∀ sufﬁciently large  :∣∣∣Pr[d ← D : 1 ← AOd (·)(d, )] − Pr[d ← D′ : 1 ← AOd (·)(d, )]∣∣∣  1q() .
Note that in both probabilities, the oracle to which the adversary has access is Od . That
is, the oracle is selected from the family Ox according to the sample drawn fromD orD′.
We also note that if no oracle access is granted at all, then the above deﬁnition reduces to
the standard notion of computational indistinguishability.
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Our intuitive notion is that a message and its pattern should appear to be the same. We
formalize this notion by saying that a message and its pattern should encode to computa-
tionally indistinguishable probability distributions. To make this formalization completely
meaningful, however, we must consider what oracle (if any) the adversary can access. This
will be determined by the oracles allowed by the underlying computational encryption
scheme.
A computational public-key encryption scheme provides indistinguishability against the
chosen-ciphertext attack 7 (also writtenCCA-2 secure in the notation of [5]) if no adversary
has a chance signiﬁcantly better than random guessing of determining accurately whether
a ciphertext c is the encryption of message m0 or message m1, even if:
• the adversary chooses m0 and m1 itself, after seeing the given public key, and
• the adversary can access a decryption oracle both before choosing the messages and
after receiving the ciphertext in question. (The decryption oracle will not decrypt c itself,
however.)
More formally:
Deﬁnition 12 (Chosen-ciphertext security). A computational public-key encryption
scheme (G,E,D) provides indistinguishability under the chosen-ciphertext attack if
∀PPT adversaries A, ∀ polynomials q, ∀ sufﬁciently large  :
Pr[ (pk, sk)← G(1);
m0,m1 ← AD1(·)(pk);
i ← {0, 1} ;
c ← E(mi, pk);
g ← AD2(·)(c) :
b = g ] 12 + 1q() .
The oracle D1(x) returns D(x, sk), and D2(x) returns D(x, sk) if x = c and returns ⊥
otherwise. The adversary is assumed to keep state between the two invocations. It is required
that m0 and m1 be of the same length.
In the terminology of [2,3], this deﬁnition requires that encryption be message-hiding.
It does not, on the other hand, require that it be key-hiding or length-hiding. It is for this
reason that “blobs” inDeﬁnition 7 are labeledwith both encrypting key and type-tree (which
indicates length of plaintext).
We will assume that the encoding mapping uses a CCA-2 secure encryption scheme.
Thus, the oracle we will use in Deﬁnition 11—to show that a message and its pattern
produce indistinguishable encodings—will exactly mirror the decryption oracles of Def-
inition 12. Those oracles will decrypt, with respect to a given public key, anything but a
given “challenge” ciphertext. Our oracles will do the same. However, a message and its
pattern can be thought of as possibly many different “challenge” ciphertexts under possibly
many different keys. It is simple to deﬁne the keys with respect to which our oracles will
decrypt:
7 See [25], which builds on the work of [22]. See also [7] for a practical implementation.
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Deﬁnition 13. Let M be a pattern. Then M|KPub = {K ∈ KPub : K  M}. If S is a set of
messages, then S|KPub = {K ∈ KPub : ∃M ∈ S s.t. K  M}.
In addition, the oracle may decrypt with respect to additional keys in some set T. (We
use this additional ﬂexibility in the proof of our main theorem.) Due to efﬁciency concerns,
however, the set T must be ﬁnite.
It is more difﬁcult to deﬁne the “challenge” ciphertexts which our oracle will not decrypt.
Most directly, they are those encryptionswhich differ between Mt and patternpk(M,T )
t
.
That is, the challenge ciphertexts should be those which correspond to “blobs” in the pattern
of M relative to the set of keys T. However, for convenience, we will deﬁne a larger but
equivalent set of challenge ciphertexts which correspond not only to the “blobs” but all
encryptions visible in M to a Dolev–Yao adversary.
Deﬁnition 14 (Visible). Let  be a bit-string, and  a set of computational public keys. Then
let vis () be the smallest set so that
•  ∈ vis (),
• if 〈a, b, “pair”〉 ∈ vis (), then a ∈ vis () and b ∈ vis (),
• if 〈c, k, “enc”〉 ∈ vis (), k ∈ , and k′ is the secret key corresponding to k, then
D(c, k′) ∈ vis (), and
• if 〈c, k, “enc”〉 ∈ vis (),
〈
k′, “privkey”
〉 ∈ vis (), and k′ is the secret key corresponding
to k, then D(c, k′) ∈ vis ().
A bit-string m is a visible element in  relative to  if m ∈ vis ().
Intuitively, x ∈ vis () iff x is an encoding ofX,  is an encoding ofM,  is an encoding of
T and X  patternpk (M, T ). That is, a bit-string is a visible element of  if the adversary
can derive it from  using only Dolev–Yao-style operations using  and keys in . The
set vis () contains every ciphertext which corresponds to a “blob” in patternpk (M, T ).
However, it also contains every other ciphertext that has an corresponding analogue in
patternpk (M, T ). The decryption oracle will not decrypt these, but this not worrisome:
the computational adversary can decrypt these “non-blobs” itself. Just as these encryptions
are not “blobbed” in patternpk (M, T ) because the required formal private key is in T or
derivable from M, the adversary can decrypt the corresponding computational ciphertext
from keys in  or derivable from  itself. Thus, we can prohibit the decryption of this more
general set without losing generality.
Now that we know the nature of our decryption oracle, we can ﬁnally deﬁne our indistin-
guishability property between messages and their patterns.As it can be considered to be the
public-key analogue ofAbadi and Rogaway’s indistinguishability result for symmetric-key
encryption [2,3], we choose to name it appropriately.
Deﬁnition 15 (Abadi–Rogaway public-key indistinguishability). The encryption scheme
providesAbadi–Rogaway public-key indistinguishability if, when used in ·t, for all nonce
distributions D, acyclic formal messages M, and ﬁnite T ⊆ KPub:
MOM,Tx patternpk (M, T ),
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where OM,Tx (, pk) returns ⊥ unless pk is a valid public key and
• either pk ∈ Kt for some K ∈ T , or
• pk ∈ Kt for some K ∈
(
M|KPub \ T
)
and  is not in visTt (x).
(The tape t is assumed to be consistent with that used to form the sample from M or
patternpk (M, T ).) In these cases, OM,Tx (, pk) returns D(, sk) where sk is the private
key corresponding to pk.
In the next section, we will show that Abadi–Rogaway public-key indistinguishabil-
ity implies weak Dolev–Yao public-key non-malleability. Before this, however, we show
that Abadi–Rogaway public-key indistinguishability can be satisﬁed by CCA-2
security.
Theorem 16. If (G,E,D) provides indistinguishability under the chosen-ciphertext attack,
then (G,E,D) provides Abadi–Rogaway public-key indistinguishability.
Proof. Suppose that the encoding mapping uses a computational encryption scheme (G,E,
D). Further, suppose that there exists a nonce distribution D, a formal message M, a set of
keysT and aPPT adversary A that can distinguish between a sample from Mt and a sample
from patternpk (M, T )
t
 (given access to the oracle in Deﬁnition 15). Then (G,E,D) does
not satisfy CCA-2 security.
We prove this by hybrid argument. Since M is acyclic, we can order the key-pairs used
in the parse tree of M as K1, K2 . . . Kk so that if Ki → Kj in the graph GM , then ij .
That is, the deeper the key in the encryptions, the smaller the number.
We go about the hybrid argument by constructing a number of intermediate patterns
betweenM and patternpk (M, T ). In particular, we construct patternsM0, M1,…Mk such
that:
• M0 = M = patternpk (M, T ∪ {K1,K2, . . . Kk}),
• Mi = patternpk (M, T ∪ {Ki−1,Ki−2, . . . Kk}), and
• Mk = patternpk (M, T ).
That is, between Mi and Mi+1 we pick a key K and replace all encryptions with that key
with blobs of the appropriate length.
We use this typeface for a running example. Suppose
M = {|A|}K1
{∣∣∣K−11 ∣∣∣}
K2
{|B|}K3 {|AB|}K2
and
T = {K3,K4} .
Assume for now that KAdv = ∅. The pattern of M is
patternpk (M, T ) = 〈|I|〉K1 〈|KPriv|〉K2 {|B|}K3 〈|I I|〉K2 .
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By using the order on keys suggested by the notation, we can let
M0 = M = {|A|}K1
{∣∣∣K−11 ∣∣∣}
K2
{|B|}K3 {|AB|}K2 ,
M1 = 〈|I|〉K1
{∣∣∣K−11 ∣∣∣}
K2
{|B|}K3 {|AB|}K2 ,
M2 = 〈|I|〉K1 〈|KPriv|〉K2 {|B|}K3 〈|I I|〉K2 ,
M3 = 〈|I|〉K1 〈|KPriv|〉K2 {|B|}K3 〈|I I|〉K2 ,
M4 = 〈|I|〉K1 〈|KPriv|〉K2 {|B|}K3 〈|I I|〉K2 .
We will use the hybrid argument on this table.
Now, suppose that the distributions M and patternpk (M, T )—the top and bottom
rows of our table—are distinguishable. That is, M OM,Tx patternpk (M, T ). Then we
know by a (standard) hybrid argument that two consecutive rows are also distinguishable. 8
We continue the hybrid argument by creating a new table between the two distinguishable
rows. Suppose that Ki is the key being “blobbed” between the two rows. Then there are
a ﬁxed number of encryptions being converted to “blobs”. Create a row for each such
encryption, so that two consecutive rows differ only in a single encryption being replaced
with a blob.
For example, if the two rows are
M1 = 〈|I|〉K1
{∣∣∣K−11 ∣∣∣}
K2
{|B|}K3 {|AB|}K2
and
M2 = 〈|I|〉K1 〈|KPriv|〉K2 {|B|}K3 〈|I I|〉K2 .
Then we could expand this into the table:
M1 = 〈|I|〉K1
{∣∣∣K−11 ∣∣∣}
K2
{|B|}K3 {|AB|}K2 ,
M1.5 = 〈|I|〉K1 〈|KPriv|〉K2 {|B|}K3 {|AB|}K2 ,
M2 = 〈|I|〉K1 〈|KPriv|〉K2 {|B|}K3 〈|I I|〉K2 .
Two of these rows must be distinguishable.
Again, there must exist two consecutive rows R1 and R2 that can be distinguished. Since
the rows differ only in the contents of a single encryption and every other part of the row
can be created independently, distinguishing between the encoding of two rows reduces to
distinguishing between two encryptions.
Let A be the adversary that can distinguish between the two rows, and let E = {|P |}K be
the encryption that is being changed into 〈|TP |〉K . Then to break the CCA-2 security of the
encryption scheme we will distinguish between an encryption of m0 and m1 under public
key pk by:
• letting m0 ← Pt,
• letting m1 ← 〈|TP |〉t, and
• treating pk as the encoding of K.
8 This only follows if the number of rows in the table is polynomial in the security parameter. In this case,
however, the number of rows in the table is constant with respect to .
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More formally:
• On input pk, select random t ← {0, 1} (or rather, the polynomial portion of it needed
to encode rows R1 and R2). Then draw p ← Pt[pk/K], where Mt[y/Y, z/Z, . . .]
is the same as Mt except that y the value for Y, z is the value for Z, and so on. (If
Y is an encryption and occurs more than once, then y is used as the value for the in-
stance of Y indicated by context. Values for the other instances are still drawn as be-
fore.) Note that because M is acyclic, we do not need to know the value K−1t to
draw from Pt. Return p and 〈|TP |〉t as candidate plaintexts. (Recall that 〈|TP |〉t
is a ﬁxed string of the appropriate length, such as the all-zero
string.)
• On input c, an encryption of either 〈|TP |〉t or p, sample s ← R1t[c/P, pk/K]. Note
that, since both t and pk were selected randomly, R1
t
[c/P, pk/K] is the same distri-
bution as R1 if c encrypts p. Similarly, R1
t
[c/P, pk/K] is the same distribution as
R2 if c encrypts 〈|TP |〉t. Feed (s, 1) to A.
• If Amakes an oracle call on (, pk), we check that pk = K0t for someK0 ∈ M|KPub∪T .
If not, we return ⊥. If so, we decrypt or not as follows:
◦ If K0 = K , we check that  is not visible in s relative to t = Tt. If it is, we return
⊥. Otherwise, since  is not visible in s relative to t and c is visible in s relative
to t,  = c. Hence, the decryption oracle D2 in Deﬁnition 12 will decrypt  for
us.
◦ If K0 = K , we can produce K−10 t ourselves from the tape t. If K0 ∈ T , we
decrypt  with the value so produced. If K0 ∈ M|KPub \ T , we also check to see
if  is visible in s relative to t. We return ⊥ if it is, and decrypt  if it
is not.
Assume in our example that rows M1.5 and M2 can be distinguished by A. Then P =
AB and K = K2. We build the two candidate ciphertexts by selecting t ← {0, 1}poly(),
where poly is a polynomial such that t is enough to encode the two rows. We then select
p ← ABt, and return p, 〈|I I|〉t as candidate ciphertexts.When we get c, a value either
from 〈|I I|〉K2t or {|AB|}K2t, we draw
s ← 〈|I|〉K1 〈|KPriv|〉K2 {|B|}K3 {|AB|}K2t[c/ {|AB|}K2 , pk/K2].
Since either s ∈ suppM1.5t or s ∈ suppM2t, the adversary A will tell us which one, and
this answer will tell us if c encrypts ABt or 〈|I I|〉t.
We simulate A on s: when A requests that we decrypt a string x with K−11 
t
, we make
sure that it is not c, Bt, or the bit-strings in s that represent 〈|I|〉K1 and 〈|KPriv|〉K2 . If it is
not these four things, we use the tape t to create the secret key and decrypt x.If A asks us to
decrypt something with K−12 
t
, we check that it is not any of the four ciphertexts above. If
it is not, then we send it to the decryption oracle provided to us in Deﬁnition 12, which will
decrypt it for us. If A asks us to decrypt with K−13 
t
 or K
−1
4 
t
, we create the keys from the
tape and decrypt any ciphertext.
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The answer from A directly corresponds to the plaintext chosen for c, which allows us to
distinguish whether it encrypts 〈|I I|〉t or p.
A(s, ) will eventually return an answer that distinguishes between samples from R1 and
R2. The answer from A will signify whether c encrypted p or 〈|TP |〉t. 
We note as a corollary that the exact analogue of the Abadi–Rogaway result holds:
if two messages M and N have the same pattern (with respect to some set T) then they
produce indistinguishable encodings. Again, our notion of indistinguishability includes
a decryption oracle while the notion used by Abadi and Rogaway does not. Hence, our
result uses a stronger form of computational encryption (chosen-ciphertext
security).
Corollary 17. Suppose that M, N are two acyclic messages, T ⊆ A is a set of keys, and
M|KPub = N |KPub . If patternpk (M, T ) = patternpk (N, T ) and the encoding operation ·t
uses an encryption scheme (G,E,D) secure against the chosen-ciphertext attack, then for
any nonce distribution D, MOM,Tx N.
Proof. By assumption and Theorem 15, we know that for any nonce distribution D,
MOM,Tx patternpk (M, T ) = patternpk (N, T )ON,Tx N.
Since M|KPub = N |KPub and patternpk (M, T ) = patternpk (N, T ), the oracle OM,Tx is the
same as the oracle ON,Tx . TheOM,Tx relation is transitive (by hybrid argument), and so the
result follows. 
We end by noting that we do not lose generality in this corollary by requiring that
M|KPub = N |KPub . IfM and N have the same pattern but have different public keys in their
parse trees, thenwe can simply formM ′ by pairingwithM every key inM|KPub∪N |KPub , and
similarly for N ′. Since we add only public keys, patternpk
(
M ′, T
) = patternpk (N ′, T ).
However, it is now the case thatM ′|KPub = N ′|KPub and the corollary holds.
6. Relating indistinguishability and non-malleability
In this section, we show that weak Dolev–Yao public-key non-malleability (Deﬁnition 6)
is no stronger a notion of security than Abadi–Rogaway public-key indistinguishability
(Deﬁnition 15).
Theorem 18. Suppose that (G,E,D) is a computational public-key encryption scheme that
provides Abadi–Rogaway public-key indistinguishability. Then (G,E,D) provides weak
Dolev–Yao public-key non-malleability.
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Proof. Suppose that the theorem is false. Then there is an adversary that is able to produce
a message outside the closure of its input set:
∃PPT adversaries A, ∃ nonce distribution D,
∃ acyclic ﬁnite S ⊆ A, ∃M ∈ C[S] ,
∃ polynomials q, for inﬁnitely many  :
Pr[ t ← {0, 1}
s ← St;
m← AMt(·),PbKt(·),PrKt(·),Rt(·)(1, s) :
m ∈ suppMt ] 1q() .
We will construct from this adversary a new adversary A1 that serves as a counter-example
to Theorem 15. But ﬁrst, consider the parse tree of M. Suppose that every path from the
root of the parse tree to a leaf passes through an element of C[S]. Then it must be that the
root message,M, is in C[S]—a contradiction. Hence, there must be some path in the parse
tree of M such that no element along that path is in C[S], including the leafMl.
Now, consider the simple, intermediate adversary A2, which operates as follows:
(1) It ﬁrst chooses a random tape t ← {0, 1}, or rather the polynomial portion of it
required to encode S, M, and the responses to adversary queries.
(2) It then uses that tape to sample s ← St.
(3) It simulates the counter-example adversary A on input (1, s).
(4) WhenAmakes an oracle query,A2 responds appropriately. (Because it knows the random
tape t, it can compute any atomic value it wishes, including those returned by the
oracles.)
(5) When A responds withm ∈ suppMt, A2 uses this to produce a valueml ∈ Mlt. That
is, it progresses down the path in the parse tree of M that leads toMl:
• It starts with a value for Mt, and at the root of the parse tree.
• If the current node is a pair,M ′N ′, then it separates the current bit-string value into
M ′t and N ′
t
. It progresses down the path in the parse tree towardMl, and keeps
the value for the new node as its new current value.
• If the current node is an encryption, {∣∣M ′∣∣}
K
, it uses the tape t to ﬁnd the value
for K−1t. It then uses that to decrypt the current bit-string value to get M
t
, and
progresses down the path in the parse tree towardMl. (Note: we know thatMl cannot
be K, since K ∈ C[S] and we know this to not be the case forMl.)
At the end, this adversary will have a value for Ml
t
. Now, consider whatMl might be:
• Ml cannot be a compound term, since it is a leaf of the parse tree.
• SupposeMl ∈ I. ThenMl ∈ C[S], no matter what S is—a contradiction.
• SupposeMl ∈ KPub. Then, as mentioned above,Ml ∈ C[S] always.
• Suppose Ml ∈ R. If Ml ∈ RAdv then Ml ∈ C[S]. So, we only need to worry about
Ml ∈ R \ RAdv. There are two cases: either Ml is in the parse tree of something in S,
or it is not. The second case leads to a contradiction. IfMl is not in the parse tree of any
element of S, then the input to the adversary is completely independent of the required
output. Thus, the adversary in question is able to guess a -bit random value based only on
independent input. The probability of this must be bounded above by 2−, contradicting
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our assumption that the probability of creating an element of suppMt (and hence an
element of suppMl
t
) is non-negligible.
• SupposeMl ∈ KPriv. Then, we proceed similar to above. IfMl ∈ KAdv, thenMl ∈ C[S].
If Ml ∈ KPriv \ KAdv but not in the parse tree of some element of S, the adversary is
able to guess a private key based on the corresponding public key, encryptions using the
public key, and values independent of the private key. Since we are assuming that the
encryption scheme provides indistinguishability against chosen-ciphertext attacks, the
probability of this must be negligible. Again, we ﬁnd a contradiction.
Thus, the only possibility is thatMl is inR \RAdv or in KPriv \KAdv, and thatMl is in
the parse tree of some element of S. However, it cannot be the case thatMl itself is in S, or
thatMl can be produced from S only by separating pairs. (If either of those were true, then
Ml would be inC[S] itself, a contradiction.) Thus,Ml must only appear in S in the plaintext
of encryptions.
Thus, we have an adversary A2 which takes an element of S
t
 and produces a (partial)
plaintext to some encryption in S. Granted, A2 created S
t
 itself and knows every secret.
HenceA2 does not serve as the counter-example to anything.However, a simplemodiﬁcation
to A2 will serve as a counterexample to Theorem 15. Let:
S′ =
{
S ∪ {Ml} ifMl ∈ R,
S ∪
{
Np,
{∣∣Np∣∣}M−1l
}
(where Np ∈ RAdv) ifMl ∈ KPriv.
Then we will be able to distinguish between S′ and patternpk
(
S′, T
)
 where T is
M|KPub \ S|KPub . (Note that ifMl is a private key, then it is in neither C[S] or T. Hence the
encryption
{∣∣Np∣∣}M−1l will become 〈|R|〉M−1l in patternpk (M, T ).)
Consider the adversary A1 that does the following:
(1) It receives as input the value d, which is drawn either from S′t or from patternpk
(
S′,
T
)
t (for some tape t). It separates d into dS and dtest, where dS ∈ St and either
dMl ∈ Mlt ifMl is a nonce, or dMl ∈ 
{
Np,
{∣∣Np∣∣}M−1l
}
t or 
{
Np, 〈|R|〉M−1l
}
t if
Ml is a private key.
(2) It simulates A on (1, dS). (We will postpone consideration of any oracle calls that A
makes for one moment.)
(3) When A returnsm, A1 will attempt to extract the value Mlt fromm. That is, it recurses
down the parse tree of M to Ml, separating pairs and decrypting encryptions, until it
arrives atMl:
• If M = N1N2 and m = 〈n1, n2, “pair”〉, then A continues recursively on n1 or n2
depending on whether N1 or N2 is on the path toMl.
• IfM = {|N |}K ,m = 〈c, k, “enc”〉 and k ∈ Kt, thenA1 sends (c, k) to the decryption
oracle. Will the decryption oracle decrypt? There are two cases:
◦ By deﬁnition, K ∈ M|KPub . If K ∈ S|KPub also, then K ∈ T . Hence, the oracle of
Deﬁnition 15 will decrypt c.
◦ IfK ∈ S|KPub , thenK ∈ S|KPub\
(
M|KPub \ S|KPub
)
. ButS|KPub\
(
M|KPub \ S|KPub
)
= S|KPub \ T . Hence, the decryption oracle of Deﬁnition 15 will decrypt c if c is
not in visTt (d). However, could c be visible in dwith respect to T
t
? If it is, then
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by the deﬁnition of visibility, {|N |}K  patternpk (S, T ). In this case, however,
T = M|KPub \ S|KPub , and so contains no keys in the parse tree of S. Allowing
the adversary to decrypt with respect to T does not give it more information about
S. Hence, patternpk (S, T ) = patternpk (S). Thus, if {|N |}K  patternpk (S, T )
then {|N |}K  patternpk (S) and so by Theorem 9 it must be that {|N |}K ∈ C[S].
However, this contradicts the assumption that no node on the path fromM toMl is in
C[S], and so c cannot be visible in d. Hence, the decryption oracle of Deﬁnition 15
will decrypt it.
Thus, the decryption oracle will always return p, the plaintext of c. A1 then moves down
the parse tree to the node for N and recursively applies this process to p.
(4) If any of the above conditions fail, then A immediately stops and outputs 0. Otherwise,
A1 will acquire a value ml which may be the encoding of Ml. A1 tests this using the
string dtest, which it reserved at the beginning. If Ml is a nonce, then dtest will be the
value forMl; A can simply test thatml = dtest. IfMl is a private key, then dtest contains
a plaintext Np
t
 and an encryption of that plaintext. A1 simply decrypts the encryption
with ml. If the result should be the same as the other value of dtest. If these tests are
satisﬁed, then A1 outputs 1. Otherwise, it outputs 0.
A1 will return 1 whenever A produces an element of suppM
t
. Hence, A1 will return 1
with probability at least 1
q() given that d is in fact drawn from S. If, on the other hand, d is
drawn from patternpk (M, T ), then A cannot have a non-negligible chance of producing a
m ∈ suppMt. SinceMl ∈ C[S], it cannot be thatMl  patternpk (S) = patternpk (S, T ).
• IfMl is a nonce, then this implies that the sample d will be entirely independent of the
actual value for Ml
t
.
• If Ml is a private key, on the other hand, then d may include encryptions made using
the public key M−1l 
t
. But the encryption provides indistinguishability against chosen-
ciphertext attack, so it is infeasible to recover a private key using only encryptions under
the corresponding public key. Since d is otherwise independent of Ml
t
, A cannot have
a non-negligible chance of recovering Ml
t
.
Thus, the probability that A1 will return 1 given that d is sampled from patternpk (S, T )
t

must be negligible.
Hence, if A has a non-negligible chance of constructing m ∈ suppMt from a sample
from St, then A1 has a non-negligible chance of distinguishing S′ from
[
patternpk
(
S′,
T
)]
, a contradiction of Theorem 15.
There remains only one last complication: A has access to oracles while operating. In
particular, A can request any public key, any private key in KAdv, any identiﬁer, and any
nonce inRAdv. How does A1 respond to these oracle calls when it simulates A?
The answer is that we slightly modify the set S′ to include the information needed to
respond. In particular, let S|KPub and S|RAdv be deﬁned analogously to S|KPub . Then the set
S′ is will actually be
S′ =
{
S ∪ S|KPub ∪ S|KAdv ∪ S|RAdv ∪ {Ml} ifMl ∈ R,
S ∪ S|KPub ∪ S|KAdv ∪ S|RAdv ∪
{
Np,
{∣∣Np∣∣}M−1l
}
ifMl ∈ KPriv.
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When A1 receives the input d it strips off dS as before and simulates A. When A makes an
oracle call, however, A1 can respond:
• If the oracle is being asked for an identiﬁer, A1 computes the representation of that
identiﬁer. (As mentioned before, we assume that the encoding of identiﬁers is efﬁciently
computable.)
• If the oracle is being called on an ingredient of S, then the additional information in s
contains the needed bit-string.
• Otherwise, the needed value is a random variable independent of d. A1 can sample from
the relevant distribution to produce an indistinguishable value. (Or, in the case ofRAdv,
it can run the nonce distribution D on a random -bit input.) It then stores the value for
future use (and if the value is a key, the corresponding secret or public key also), and
returns it.
Since the formal messages we added to S′ are already in C[S], they do not change the
pattern of the original S. Hence, adding them to S′ does not change the distribution of dS ,
and A will progress as before. 
7. Conclusion and open problems
The primary contribution of this paper is three-fold:
(1) First, we presented a deﬁnition of weak Dolev–Yao public-key non-malleability, which
directly captures the main assumptions of the Dolev–Yao model.
(2) We then translated Abadi and Rogaway’s deﬁnition of indistinguishability from the
secret-key to the public-key setting, and showed that it is satisﬁed by encryption that
provides indistinguishability under the chosen-ciphertext attack.
(3) Lastly, we showed that Abadi–Rogaway public-key indistinguishability implies weak
Dolev–Yao public-key non-malleability.
One obvious extension of this work would be to examine the relationship between Abadi–
Rogaway indistinguishability and Dolev–Yao non-malleability further. In many settings,
non-malleability is either equivalent to or strictly stronger than indistinguishability. The
fact thatAbadi–Rogaway indistinguishability implies Dolev–Yao non-malleability is strong
evidence for their equivalence in this setting, but the question remains open.
Another interesting way to extend this work would be to strengthen the deﬁnition of
Dolev–Yao non-malleability. The current deﬁnition states, informally, that the adversary
has only a negligible chance of “hitting” a given target (i.e., producing an encoding of a
given M). If possible, it would be interesting to ﬁnd an encryption scheme that keeps the
adversary from hitting any target:
Deﬁnition 19 (Strong Dolev–Yao non-malleability). A computational encryption scheme
provides strong Dolev–Yao public-key non-malleability if, when used in the ·t operation,
the adversary cannot create anything outside the closure:
∀PPT adversaries A, ∀ﬁnite, acyclic S ⊆ A,
∀ polynomials q, ∀ sufﬁciently large  :
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Pr[ t ← {0, 1}
s ← St;
m← AMt(·),PbKt(·),PrKt(·),Rt(·)(1, s) :
∃M ∈ A \ C[S] .m ∈ suppMt ] 1q() .
A third way to improve this work would be to remove the requirement that S be acyclic.
(This would most likely also remove the same assumption from the results of Abadi and
Rogaway [2].)
Lastly, it would be interesting to incorporate into this approach cryptographic operations
other than encryption, such as hashes and signatures.
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